Yes! I'm still plogging away..
Sorry for my absence my pretty petunias! It is partly explained by the need to completely surrender to, enshrine and otherwise consecrate the CFA charter whilst one figuratively yet painfully nails oneself to the Institute's textbooks, quick sheets, question banks and practice tests. My absence is further explained by the fact that I have been trying to decide how best to present all the reading I have been doing. Since my last article I have read 10 books on the subject of the American political system and its courts in the context of how the power players pull the strings and what distortions result. Personally, I find it riveting stuff but admittedly the average person might prefer to stab themselves in the neck with a pencil. I have decided to carry on covering the books that I found especially useful, one book at a time, and in so doing fully shield readers from their “long and boring"-ness. The design of the technology platform I am building has been influenced by the information I gather in these readings. I cannot properly express how excited I am about the prospect of building a platform that could potentially allow American citizens to meaningfully participate in their political system precisely where the action takes place - Congress - in a way that is fun and simple. As I wade through statistical data and theses sprouted from colleges around the country; as I explain the required functions of the platform to clever developers who are tasked to build it and as I gather information over the phone from (sometimes helpful/sometimes cogent) offices in Congress to learn how to stay abreast of congressional action – I think I can say I am enjoying the process, mostly. Ha. Phew… It’s definitely more rewarding than dating men in Manhattan (which ranks as a most utterly unfathomable task and which I will gladly leave to greater mortals than I.)
Of the books I have read recently Seth Masket’s No Middle Ground proved delightfully revealing
as to who controls politics and how they control it. This article is dedicated to that book.
Right!
Right!
Republican and Democratic nominations
for seats are decided in primaries. Masket
argues that primaries typically have low media coverage and low voter turnout so
they are easily controlled by legislative leaders and informal party
organizations (IPOs.) His theory is based on the fact that nominations are the
key to controlling politics. Once
nominated the nominee usually wins the general election. Of California's 88
seats only 5 were contested in 2002. Except those 5 seats the rest were safely in the
hands of a party. Published in
2011 Masket's book contains ample statistical analysis of data to support his thesis. He analyzes the state of California and names
influential people and groups that form IPOs in the state thereby helping the
reader to properly grasp who is pulling the strings and how they are being
pulled.
Masket proves empirically that most elected officials were
originally nurtured within these groups.
By studying 125 officeholders in California (including congresspersons,
senators, assembly members and county supervisors) and finding out what their
prior employment was he surmises that roughly 9 out of 10 politicians rose out
of the auspices of IPOs. In a subsequent
study he looks at 94 elections and 366 candidates between 1998 and 2004. He finds that membership in an IPO put a
candidate at a significant advantage to those who chose to go it alone. He also explains that the groups seek to
control nominations broadly in local, state and federal offices in
their region so that supportive politicians can help them procure jobs,
construction projects, better tax policies or achieve ideological goals. The payoff for controlling a portion of
government, in the form of subsidies, ideological benefits and preferential
treatment, can be very large.
In California the IPOs are as
follows. Orange County is a wealthy area and its citizens tend to vote right of center. Nominations in this area are
influenced by 2 private clubs. The first
and oldest is the Lincoln Club which consists of conservative Republicans. They charge an annual fee of $3500 to their
members who are affluent private individuals.
Orange Country also has a more moderate Republican club called The New
Majority who are a newer outfit and charge a $10,000 annual fee. Nominations in poorer districts tend to be
influenced by groups that are in the public domain. In the poorer areas of South and East LA
prominent elected officials provide the leadership forming alliances with
churches, clubs and unions. An example
of a notable club in South LA is the New Frontiers Democratic Club. Influential elected officials that aggregate
donor funds and organize campaigns are Representatives Waters, Dynally
and Burke. A representative is a member of Congress. In East LA the Alatorre-Torres
machine and Representative Molina have produced dozens of officeholders out of
their staff members. Wealthy West LA nominations were controlled by the Democratic
Waxman-Berman machine in the past and are now controlled by the LA County Federation
of Labor. Fresno County nominations are
controlled by both sides. On the Democratic
side Labor Union 353 and Representatives Dooley and Reyes influence
which candidates prevail. Priming
candidates on the Republican side are chairman of the Fresno Lincoln Club Michael
Der Manouel and The Sheriff and Police Officers Association. These groups interview, recruit and train
candidates months ahead of the primaries.
The gradual shift toward extreme partisanship
in Californian politics over the last 40 years is starkly displayed in a series
of graphs at the start of the book. Masket attributes this to the influence of IPO groups. He quotes Aldrich "activists tend to be
ideologically extreme.. moving away from the median voter may cost the
candidate votes but that may be outweighed by the resources received.”
IPOs
interview candidates that are
already running and look to back a horse that is likely to win. Several
politicians interviewed came up with a $50,000 figure for what the
candidate must be able to raise on their own. $50,000 is not enough to
win a
race. This is ostensibly what a
candidate needs to raise on their own in order for an IPO to back them and
cough up the rest of the money required which totals roughly $260,000 per race. IPOs say that money raising ability is the
number one skill they look for in a candidate.
Masket argues that IPOs control
politics better than alliances in congress. Party leadership in Congress can
reward or deny privileges but the IPO can simply fire the officeholder. He cites a number of cases where this has
happened. In general incumbents are
pretty safe in office (In 2002 99% of incumbents retained their seats) so
IPOs are not typically executing the power they wield over the official. Presumably they can keep officials in line
partly because of the examples they have set in the past and partly because the officials were
mainly born from within these systems and know the dangers well. The evidence Masket brings to the table
certainly shows the officials voting in line with the groups that put them in
office.
A lot of the evidence presented in this
book requires an understanding of a concept called cross-filing. Revolting against the control political machines
such as the Southern Pacific Railroad had over Californian politics a group of
individuals managed to institute progressive reforms in 1914. Cross-filing was one of these reforms. It meant anyone from any party could run in both the the Democratic and Republican primary and party affiliation was not
mentioned on the voting ballot. This
feature made it much harder for parties to effectively challenge an incumbent since
a challenging candidate they chose to back would now have more challengers and
would not be affiliated to a party, a fact that caused voter confusion. The statistics presented certainly demonstrate a party’s
effort to control politics became completely ineffective during the cross-filing period since candidates
entirely stopped “towing the party line” (or voting with their parties.) My favorite chart in the whole book shows the
“before and after” effect of the cross-filing era which ended in 1952. Within 10 years the change in politicians’ polarization (the extent to which politicians voted with their
parties a.k.a. partisanship) was simply remarkable.
Curiously cross-filing turned out to be
bad for the average citizen. During the cross-filing period candidates stopped responding to the requirements of parties and instead created coalitions
(often attached to the speaker) and were more readily acquiescing to the wants
of donors or business groups. As proof,
Masket goes on to show several graphs depicting clear voting patterns of
coalitions formed around a specific speaker at different points during the
cross-filing period.
During the cross filing period Masket
states that voters needs were not being met even though it looked like they
were. The speaker has the power to
appoint committee personnel and to decide if and when a bill makes it to the floor. Lobbyists only demanded candidates vote their
way when voting for the speaker. One
member was quoted as saying he could be a free agent 99% of the time and vote
according to the desires of his district as long as he voted for the right
speaker so the lobbyists could “bottle up the bills.” This behavior is still
commonplace today. As a demonstration of
how the formation of these speaker coalitions has become standard practice in
California Masket goes on to list a number of recent speakers and the reported
sums raised by each speaker from lobbyists. These sums would then be doled out by each speaker to
support candidates running for office.
Masket's base line message is that today’s
IPOs are more ideological than average Americans. Candidates need the support of the IPO more
than they need the voter so they vote to meet the desires of the IPO. But compared to the older systems we have got
closer to meeting the citizen’s needs. IPOs
came into existence after cross-filing and became an effective counterweight to
private benefit seekers and the speaker’s organization. Masket argues that the
organized party system is a better environment for the poor to have a mechanism
with which to fight for and effect changes to their rights.
As if this evidence were not enough Masket
presents the results of a survey he did on 25 politicians, staff members,
lobbyists and other industry insiders in which 68% of insiders surveyed
said nominations are controlled by a network of donors, officeholders and
activists.
The conclusions of the book are as
follows: 1) Parties consist of a variety of actors inside and outside politics;
2) Candidates need these organizations to win no matter how well funded they
are; 3) They are not structured like the traditional party organizations of
yesteryear and avoid most of the corruption.
However, they are not representative of the median voter.
Some solutions to this conclusion
(namely to the fact that our elected officials do not represent the voter)
would be to work on increasing voter turn out in primaries and to publicly
finance primaries.
My last article which covered campaign
finance reform arrived at a similar conclusion.
I will reiterate the point I made then.
The cost of publicly financing elections was found to be one four hundredth
of the overall budget. Clearly it is
well worth spending that sum to ensure the rest of the budget is allocated
without the distortion introduced when candidates are relying on donors for
reelection.
That's that! In the words of the illustrious Arnold
Schwarzenegger: “I’ll be back..”
I am Cecilia Mackie, MPhys and I worked on Wall Street for 10 years where I rose to an executive level. The owners of a firm I worked at are now in jail. Because of this experience I have avidly researched corruption based issues over the last few years. Outside of this plog, I am building a tech platform which will allow people to participate in a community for political change. The platform will have a mechanism to allow our community to enact change within the world of American politics.
Please go to www.mackiemusic.com to access my social media pages and learn more about my polymathematical world of wonder!
I am Cecilia Mackie, MPhys and I worked on Wall Street for 10 years where I rose to an executive level. The owners of a firm I worked at are now in jail. Because of this experience I have avidly researched corruption based issues over the last few years. Outside of this plog, I am building a tech platform which will allow people to participate in a community for political change. The platform will have a mechanism to allow our community to enact change within the world of American politics.
Please go to www.mackiemusic.com to access my social media pages and learn more about my polymathematical world of wonder!
